The Heterogeneous Effect of Information on Student Performance : Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial in Mexico by Avitabile, Ciro & Hoyos, Rafael de
Policy Research Working Paper 7422
The Heterogeneous Effect of Information 
on Student Performance
Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial in Mexico
Ciro Avitabile 
Rafael de Hoyos
Education Global Practice Group
September 2015
WPS7422
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Produced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 7422
This paper is a product of the Education Global Practice Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide 
open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at cavitabile@
worldbank.org.
A randomized control trial was conducted to study whether 
providing 10th grade students with information about the 
returns to upper secondary and tertiary education, and 
a source of financial aid for tertiary education, can con-
tribute to improve student performance. The study finds 
that the intervention had no effects on the probability of 
taking a 12th grade national standardized exam three years 
after, a proxy for on-time high school completion, but 
a positive and significant impact on learning outcomes 
and self-reported measures of effort. The effects are larger 
for girls and students from households with a relatively 
high income. These findings are consistent with a simple 
model where time discount determines the increase in 
effort and only students with adequate initial conditions 
are able to translate increased effort into better outcomes. 
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1 Introduction
Early work for developing countries finds that providing information about the labor market
returns to education had a positive impact on student attainments (Jensen 2010; Nguyen
2008).1 These results, coupled with the low costs of these interventions, have induced schol-
ars and policy makers to advocate for a more extensive usage of information interventions
to boost students’ outcomes in developing countries.2 However, while there is growing con-
∗The paper has been screened to ensure no confidential information is r evealed. The original design of the 
Percepciones project benefited f rom d iscussions w ith Erik B loom, Robert J ensen and Harry P atrinos. We 
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for project and data management at the Mexican Secretariat of Public Education (SEP) at the time of 
implementing the project. We thank Caio Piza, Laura Trucco and participants at the World Bank’s impact 
evaluation seminar (DIME) and Banco de México for their comments. The authors gratefully 
acknowledge funding from the World Bank’s Research Support Budget.
†The World Bank. 1818 H Street NW, 20433 Washington DC. Corresponding Author. E-mail: cav-
itabile@worldbank.org.
‡The World Bank. 1818 H Street NW, 20433 Washington DC. E-mail: rdehoyos@worldbank.org. 
1Jensen (2010) finds that providing information about the returns to lower secondary has a very large 
impact on school completion rates among eight graders in the Dominican Republic. Nguyen (2008) shows 
an increase in attendance of fourth graders in Madagascar as a result of information about the labor market 
returns to lower secondary education. More recently, Dinkelman and Martínez (2014) find that information 
about financial aid for tertiary education had a significant impact on college preparatory enrollment, school 
attendance, and financial aid knowledge among eight graders in Chile. Loyalka et al. (2013) finds that 
providing information on college costs and financial aid to high school students in poor regions of northwest 
China increases the probability of attending college.
2A number of studies analyze the impact of information about the benefits and costs of higher education 
on students’ perceptions in developed countries (see, among others, Oreopoulos and Dunn (2013) for Canada 
and McGuigan et al. (2012) for the UK.)
sensus that quality - rather than quantity - of education is an important driver of economic
growth (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008; Hanushek and Woessmann 2012), it is unclear
whether information interventions can have long-lasting impact on student achievements. If
students expect labor market returns lower than the observed ones, information interventions
might be able to increase their effort, and ultimately improve their performance in school.
Existing evidence shows either short term positive impact (Nguyen (2008) for Madagascar)
or no impact (Fryer (2013) for the US) on learning in early grades.3 This paper presents
evidence from a randomized control trial conducted in Mexico to study whether an informa-
tion intervention targeting 10th grade students had an impact on their performance in 12th
grade.4
Mexico, as well as other middle-income countries, has reached almost universal enrollment
rates in primary and lower secondary, but still faces important challenges in the education
system, especially in upper secondary. Only six out of every ten students who enroll in
upper secondary education graduate. Education achievements are characterized by large
disparities, with those accounted for by gender being particularly striking. Although girls
perform at least as well as boys throughout primary and lower secondary education in all
subjects, as witnessed by their scores in 6th and 9th grade national census based standardized
test - Evaluación Nacional de Logro Académico en Centros Escolares (ENLACE), girls fall
dramatically behind boys in 12th grade math scores (see Table 1). While the quality of school
supply might play an important role, there is not full clarity on the individual characteristics
that can explain the attainment and the achievement gaps. Financial constraints, lack of
information and social norms may be important demand side factors behind the high drop
out and low learning outcomes, but disentangling their role is empirically challenging.
In 2009 the Mexican Secretariat of Public Education (SEP for its acronym in Spanish),
in an attempt to improve on-time graduation and learning outcomes in upper secondary,
designed and implemented an intervention to provide students entering 10th grade with a
range of information about the returns to upper secondary and tertiary education, as well
as on life expectancy and funding opportunities for tertiary education. The pilot program,
known as Percepciones, included an evaluation strategy based on a stratified randomized
control trial (RCT), with 26 schools assigned to the treatment group and 28 to the control
group. In November 2009 the baseline data was collected and the information treatment was
delivered. Using 2012 administrative data from the 12th grade national standardized EN-
3Nguyen (2008) shows an increase in test scores of fourth graders in Madagascar three months after the
intervention. Fryer (2013) finds no impact on student scores in sixth and seventh grade.
4Throughout the paper we will use upper secondary education and high school indifferently when we refer
to grades 10 to 12. We will use lower secondary when referring to grades 7 to 9.
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LACE exam, we measure the impact of the information treatment on a proxy for completing
upper secondary on time and standardized test scores in math and language (Spanish). We
shed light on some of the behavioral responses induced by the intervention using information
from a survey that was administered at the time of the test to a random sample of exam
takers.
Our results show that, almost three years after the treatment was implemented the in-
formation package had no impact on the proxy for completing high school on time. On
average, the intervention had a large and statistically significant impact on math test scores
(0.29 standard deviations), and a positive but not statistically significant impact on language
scores. A more detailed analysis shows that the treatment had a large and significant effect
on the learning outcomes of female students and those who belong to relatively better off
households. Both boys and girls update their expectations as a result of the intervention,
but only girls report a higher level of effort and switch to more demanding upper secondary
subtracks, with higher expected returns in the labor market. Neither the initial level of infor-
mation about returns to education nor differences in time preferences seem to explain much
of the differential effect for boys and girls. There is also no evidence that the gender related
heterogeneity is driven by gender-specific parents’ or teachers’ responses. We conjecture
that at least in the sample we consider, boys have lower scope to increase their effort. The
stronger impact on better-off students is consistent with the hypothesis that the increase in
effort can translate into better learning outcomes only if complemented with sufficient initial
conditions as proxied by household income.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First we contribute to a better understanding
of the effects of information on different educational outcomes. The very large and significant
effects on school attainments in rural Dominican Republic (Jensen 2010) and Madagascar
(Nguyen 2008) contrast with the zero impact found for the US (Fryer 2013), China (Loy-
alka et al. 2013) and Mexico in this paper. In low income countries, providing information
about school returns might be sufficient to induce at-risk students to stay in school since
the alternative option may be particularly low. However, in medium and high income coun-
tries, the higher probability of finding a paid job might induce at-risk students to drop out,
irrespective of how well informed they are.5 Unlike previous work, we provide evidence on
the impact of information on learning at the end of high school, an outcome that is likely to
be correlated with youth labor market outcomes (Murphy and Peltzman 2004). The aver-
5Atkin (2012) finds for Mexico that the employment opportunities for low-skill workers in the manufac-
turing sector generated by trade liberalization had significant consequences on school drop-out: for every
twenty new jobs created in the manufacturing sector, one student dropped out at grade nine rather than
continuing on through grade twelve.
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age impact is non-negligible and statistically significant, and given the virtually zero cost of
the intervention this result provides further support to the cost-effectiveness of information
interventions.
In many disadvantaged contexts educational choices made by girls are likely to be affected
by social norms, rather than potential labor market outcomes.6 Information interventions
as the one included in the Percepciones program can be an effective way of changing girls’
educational choices, improve their learning outcomes and, eventually their labor market
outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents general information regarding the
upper secondary education system in Mexico and a description of the information treatment
within the Percepciones project. In Section 3 we discuss a simple framework to describe how
information can affect student performance together with the data used for our analysis. The
econometric model and the main results are presented in Section 4. Potential explanations
for the large gender heterogeneity are discussed in Section . Finally, Section 6 concludes and
provides policy recommendations.
2 Context
The upper secondary education (EMS for its acronym in Spanish) system in Mexico consists
of 4.1 million students, typically between 15 to 18 years old, in grades 10th, 11th and 12th.
EMS is offered by four different providers: 1) the federal government (accounting for 26% of
total enrollment), 2) the state government (43.8%), 3) publicly-financed autonomous univer-
sities (12.5%), and 4) private entities. EMS offers three types of degree programs: general –
preparing students for higher education, technological – preparing students both for the labor
market as well as for higher education, and technical – emphasizing technical and vocational
education. The typically large technological schools run by the Federal Government (930
students on average) can belong to different subsystems according to their specialization:
industrial (DGETI), agricultural (DGETA) and ocean-related (DGCYTM).
According to the official statistics from SEP,7 in 2013 only 61% of students graduated
three years after enrolling, with this share being significantly higher among women (65%)
than men (57%). Graduation rates vary across types of degree programs with general schools
6Attanasio and Kaufmann (2012a) found for Mexico that educational choices of boys are more likely to
be correlated with expectations on the labor market returns of higher education than girls’ expectations,
which display a stronger correlation with their aspirations to form a family. Kaufmann et al. (2013) use
data from Chile to show that being admitted to a higher ranked university has substantial returns in terms
of partner quality for women.
7See http://www.inee.edu.mx/index.php/bases-de-datos/banco-de-indicadores-educativos
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showing the highest (64%), followed by technological schools with rates very close to the
national average and technical schools showing the lowest (48%). More than 60% of the
cumulative dropouts throughout the three years of EMS take place during the first year.
The decision behind early drop out can be partly explained by the combination of high
risk of repetition (the average grade repetition rate was about 15% in 2013) and the strict
promotion criteria used in EMS. Students must pass five out of eight disciplinary subject
areas and practical modules, otherwise they have to repeat the semester. Additionally,
students must pass all their subject areas and modules (around eight in total per semester)
within ten semesters after enrolling in EMS, otherwise they lose the right to re-enroll.
The Percepciones pilot took place in 54 technological EMS schools run by the Federal
Government. The objective of the Percepciones pilot was to evaluate the effectiveness of a
low cost information intervention to increase on-time high school graduation and increase
learning outcomes. The design of the Percepciones project benefited substantially from
the survey collected in 2005 as part of the evaluation of the Mexican program Jóvenes con
Oportunidades. The 2005 survey showed that there was a misperception about the returns to
education when compared to the returns from the labor survey ENOE (Encuesta Nacional
de Ocupación y Empleo), especially among girls, thus providing scope for the intervention.8
A randomized control trial was designed to evaluate the impact of the intervention. Figure
1 shows the time line of the project spanning from May 2009 to May 2012. The design of
the intervention, randomization and sampling took place between June and August 2009.
Following a two-step stratified sampling by regions (north, center, and south), the 54 schools
were randomly allocated into 26 treatment schools and 28 control schools. The selected
schools had an average of 8 classrooms in 10th grade, with around 40 students in each
classroom. For each school, at least two 10th grade classrooms were randomly selected to
participate in the pilot. In total, 111 classrooms and 4,145 students were included in the
experiment.9
2.1 Description of the Treatment
The intervention was conducted in November 2009 (Figure 1). An interactive computer
software, designed explicitly for the project, gathered information on students’ perceived
returns to schooling and, in the case of the treatment group, provided the information
package. Given the design of the intervention, all of the students in the treatment group
8See Attanasio and Kaufmann (2012b) for a detailed description of the expectations module included in
the Jóvenes con Oportunidades survey.
9For two schools the first two randomly selected classrooms were too small, and additional classrooms
had to be selected.
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who completed the baseline survey were exposed to the information, thus guaranteeing perfect
compliance.
In order to elicit the information on perceived returns to schooling, the computer software
used three subjective expectation questions, similar to the ones included in the Jóvenes con
Oportunidades survey:
1. If you were to quit studying right now and hence lower secondary is your highest degree,
what do you think is the amount you can earn per month at ages 30 to 40?
2. If you finish upper secondary and do not continue studying, what do you think is the
amount you can earn per month at ages 30 to 40?
3. If you get a university degree and do not continue studying, what do you think is the
amount you can earn per month at ages 30 to 40?
Similarly, the computer software elicited information about the students’ perception
about the returns to schooling for an average person, as opposed to expectations about
his or her own returns.10 Students in the treatment group received three main information
contents. First, they were given gender-specific information on the monetary returns to
schooling, as computed using data from ENOE second quarter of 2009. The information on
the returns to education was given in the form of additional monthly pesos earned by upper
secondary working full time as well as the net present value of the additional income flows
assuming entry and exit to the labor market at ages 25 and 65, respectively:
In Mexico a man (woman) between 30 and 40 years old with a maximum educa-
tion level of lower secondary earns, on average, $4,832 ($3,179) MX per month.11
A man (woman), ages 30 to 40, with an upper secondary diploma earns, on av-
erage, $6,466 ($4,827) MX per month, or $1,634 ($1,648) MX more per month.
Therefore a man (woman) with an upper secondary diploma earns, on average,
$784,320 ($791,040) MX more than those with a lower secondary degree through-
out his (her) productive life.
Students in the treatment group also received information about the returns to univer-
sity in a format similar to the one presented above. The second type of information content
10The three questions read as follows: (1) what do you think is the amount earned per month by a man
(woman) between 30 and 40 years old with a lower secondary degree?; (2) what do you think is the amount
earned per month by a man (woman) between 30 and 40 years old with an upper secondary degree?; (3)
what do you think is the amount earned per month by a man (woman) between 30 and 40 years old with a
university degree?
11In November 2009 $1 MX was approximately $0.08 US.
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is about a higher education scholarship program run by the federal government (PRON-
ABES). While most of the Mexican higher education system is public and free of charge,
the PRONABES program targets student from households with a monthly income equal to
or below three minimum wages, and provides grants that vary from $750 MX to $1,000 MX
per month for the entire length of the higher education course. Finally, students received
information about life expectancy (differentiated by gender). Additionally, a 15-second video
summarizing the message that youth can empower themselves with education was shown to
the students in the treatment group.
Most of the interventions that have been previously tested provide information either on
the expected financial returns of education (Jensen 2010; Nguyen 2008) or on the sources of
financial aid (Dinkelman and Martínez 2014).12 The Percepciones project gave students an
information package, that covers the financial returns of secondary and tertiary education,
one source of financial aid for tertiary education and life expectancy. The intervention’s
design does not allow for the assessment of whether our results are driven by any specific
piece of information or by the entire package.
3 Conceptual Framework and Data
3.1 Conceptual Framework
We borrow the simple two period framework presented in Fryer (2013) to help rationalize the
linkages between the information intervention and student outcomes. Student’s education
outcomes (S) at time t is a function (f) of her/his effort (e) and a set of predetermined
characteristics (µ0), that include, among others, parental education, household income, and
neighborhood characteristics.
Si,t = f(ei,t, µ0i) (1)
Mirroring Fryer (2013), we assume that: a) f is twice continuously differentiable in e
and µ0; b) f exhibits diminishing marginal returns to e; c) e and µ0 are complements in the
education production function. At time t+1 the student enters the labor market and his/her
labor market outcomes (Y ) are a function of the school outcomes at time t and a parameter
(ν), that measures students’ perceived returns to education outcomes. Both attainments
and performance in school are likely to affect Y . We assume that earnings are increasing in
12An exception is McGuigan et al. (2012) that tests the impact of a large set of information about the
benefits and costs of university on the perceptions of high school students in the UK.
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S, although at a declining rate. Increases in the perceived returns, ν, increase Y at all levels
of S.
maxe [β [Yi,t+1(Si,t(ei,t), ν)]− C(ei,t)] (2)
The individual chooses effort at time t maximizing the future earnings discounted at the
time discount rate β, minus the cost of effort (C(e)). In this very simple setting, information
about returns to education will increase the optimal level of effort to the extent that: a) the
student’s perceived returns are significantly lower than the actual returns; and b) the student
places a significant value to future consumption (high β). However, an increase in effort does
not necessarily generate an increase in student performance. In fact, if the complementarity
between e and µ0 does not hold and/or the student does not know how to translate increased
effort into better outcomes, an increase in effort might not lead to improved performance.
3.2 Baseline Data
In order to measure students’ characteristics at the baseline, we use two sources. First, we
rely on the survey administered to the students in November 2009, just before the treatment
was rolled out. In addition to providing information about the perceived returns to schooling,
students were asked, among others, questions about the source of information about the
returns, household income,13 parents’ education and work status. The baseline survey also
included a module that elicits students’ inter-temporal preferences. The respondent was
asked to consider a hypothetical situation in which he/she wins a certain amount of money
that can be cashed in now, or can be cashed in later for a larger sum.
Second, we use administrative data on 9th grade ENLACE scores in math and language
to measure students’ ability before entering high school. From 2007 to 2013, ENLACE was
administered to all students in 3rd to 9th and 12th grades. The test is voluntary and bears
no consequences either on graduation or a student’s GPA. The score is normalized to have
a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. Mexican citizens have a unique personal
identifier, known as Clave Única de Registro Poblacional, CURP, formed by an algorithm
combining name, surname, date of birth, sex, state of birth, plus 2 randomly generated
digits. Using the student’s personal information collected during the baseline survey we
could generate a quasi-CURP that only differs from the original one for the lack of the last
13Information regarding household income was reported in brackets as follows: 1) less than $1,500 MX, 2)
between $1,501 and $3500, 3) between $3,501 and $7,000, 4) between $7,001 y $10,000, 5) between $10,001
and $15,000, 6) $15,001 y $25,000, 7) more than $25,000 MX. Information about household income was not
reported by 14% of the students, but the attrition rate is not statistically different for the treatment and
control group.
8
two randomly generated digits making possible a merge between the baseline survey with
the micro data from ENLACE 9th grade.14 For 75.5% of the students in our sample, we
can recover their 9th scores ENLACE score, with 68% taking the exam in 2009, 1.1% in
2007 and 0.4% in 2006.15 There are two potential explanations for the partial attrition of
9th grade scores: 1) the exam is voluntary and students enrolled in upper secondary might
have not taken it; 2) matching related issues either because the information provided during
the baseline was not sufficient to generate the quasi-CURP, or for the presence of multiple
individuals with the same identifier. Only for five individuals out of 4,145 we were not able
to generate a quasi-CURP.
Table 2 shows the baseline characteristics, for the full sample as well as separately for
boys and girls, distinguishing between students in the treatment and the control groups.
In the top panel we report the socioeconomic characteristics measured through the baseline
survey, in the bottom panel the administrative information on 9th grade test scores. Overall,
the characteristics of the treatment and control group seem well balanced in line with the
randomized design of the evaluation. For boys we find that, out of 23 variables, only the
probability that the father works is statistically higher in the treatment than in the control
group (p-value=0.011), but the size of the difference is economically negligible. In order
to account for these imbalances, our main specification controls for all the variables that
display significant imbalances. On average, 93% of the fathers work, as opposed to 45% of
the mothers; fathers tend to be more educated than mothers, since 31% of the formers have,
at least, completed high school as opposed to 24% of the latter. About 40% of the students
have access to an Internet connection at home.
Self-reported measures of effort do not display major differences between boys and girls,
neither when we consider the number of hours spent doing homework (5.62 for boys and
5.11 for girls), nor when we look at the number of school days missed last month (2.8 for
boys and girls). Girls report a much lower probability of having failed at least one subject
in lower secondary school than boys (19% versus 30%).
Students in the treatment group are more likely to be matched with 9th grade test score
results and the difference is marginally significant at 10%. In 9th grade girls perform better
than boys in language, irrespective of whether we consider the test score or the probability
of being classified as insufficient, and they do as well as boys in math (approximately 35% of
them are classified as insufficient). Previous work using data from low- and middle-income
14Given that the CURP and the information to form the quasi-CURP is confidential, the merge between
the baseline survey information and the micro information of ENLACE was done by staff at the SEP.
15Students who could be matched with 9th grade score are different from those who could not be matched
along some dimensions (see Table AI) but most differences are economically small.
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countries shows that the gender gap in math is present as early as 4th grade (Bharadwaj et al.
2012). This is not the case for Mexico. In order to assess whether our sample is representative
of the Mexican population, we follow the nationwide cohort of 6th grade ENLACE takers in
the year 2007 over to 9th (in 2010) and 12th grade (in 2013). Girls do consistently better
than boys in language and the gap stays constant throughout the different grades. Neither
in 6th grade nor in 9th grade is there evidence of a gender gap in math, but girls’ 12th grade
score in math is 30 points (0.30σ) lower than boys’ (Table 1). The gender gap in 12th grade
may be partly explained by differential selection: 28.6% of the boys who took the ENLACE
6th grade in 2007 completed the 12 grade exam in 2013, as opposed to 34.9% of the girls.
3.3 Follow-up Data
Students enrolled in 10th grade in 2009 were supposed to complete high school in 2012.16 We
use data from the 2012 12th grade ENLACE exam to measure the three main outcomes of
interest: the probability of taking the test, math scores, and Spanish scores. We interpret the
probability of taking the 12th grade test in 2012 as a proxy for the probability of completing
upper secondary on time. 61% of the students surveyed at the baseline took part in the
12th grade ENLACE exam three years later. Not observing a student who was originally
enrolled in EMS in 2009 take part in the 12th grade ENLACE exam in 2012 has four possible
explanations: 1) the student dropped out of school at any point between 9th and 12th grade,
2) the student repeated one or more semesters, 3) the student did not show up for the exam
but regularly completed the EMS, 4) or potential merging problems. Using 2013 data from
12th grade ENLACE we find that 205 students from the original sample (4.9%) took the
exam in 2013, most likely because they had to repeat two full semesters.17 The probability
of taking ENLACE in 2013 is not statistically different for treatment and control schools. In
order to provide a measure of the no-showing up rate, we collected the 2012 lists of all the
potential 12th grade ENLACE takers that each school had to send to the central authority
roughly two months before the test. On average, 10% of the students reported on the list did
not show up for the exam, but they are likely to complete EMS regularly. Reassuringly, the
no-showing-up rate is not statistically different for treatment and control schools. Finally,
only for five students the quasi-CURP was not sufficient to identify them since it was not
unique. Therefore, we interpret the difference in probability of taking the 12th grade exam
between the treatment and control groups as a good measure of the intervention’s effect on
16The northern State of Nuevo León is an exception since public upper secondary schools follow a two-year
program.
17Students who repeat either one or three semesters leave school without taking the test.
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the probability of finishing upper secondary on time.
In order to measure how expectations about the returns to education have changed in
response to the intervention, we rely on the data from a nationwide survey administered
to 20% of all 12th grade exam takers, the so called ENLACE de contexto. In our sample,
730 students were administered the ENLACE de contexto. The 2012 survey gathers, among
others, information on expected monthly earnings at ages 30 to 40 on two hypothetical
scenarios of educational attainments, high school completion and university degree. These
questions read exactly the same as the ones asked in the baseline survey, but the answers
are given using a pre-codified set of brackets.18
The ENLACE de contexto does not collect objective measures of student effort but it
elicits self-reported assessment. The respondent is asked how the statement “I am a person
who works hard in school” describes him or her in one of the following ways: 1) it does not
describe me at all, 2) it describes me a little bit, 3) it describes me, 4) it describes me a lot,
5) it fully describes me. Students are also asked which subtrack they chose as part of the
technological school curriculum.
3.4 Perceptions about Returns to Schooling
As discussed in section 2.1, the baseline survey asked both about student’s own expected
earnings and the student’s expected returns for the average person. While variation in
the perceived returns for oneself reflects both possible misperceptions about the education
returns and heterogeneity in subjective valuations of how well oneself can do in the labor
market, dispersion in perceived average returns would just reflect misperception. Table 3
reports the gender specific mean and standard deviation of the expected monthly wages for
themselves and for the average person, separately for the treatment and the control group.
For none of the measures of perceived returns, the difference between the treatment and the
control group is statistically significant.19
At the baseline, the mean expected monthly wage for oneself, having completed high
school as the highest degree, among boys in the control schools ($5,531 MX) is not statically
different from the average wage for a man with high school degree between 30 and 40 using
data from ENOE ($5,722 MX). When asked about the expected wage for an average man
between 30 and 40, the average expected value is substantially lower ($4,282 MX). On
18The earnings brackets for both questions are: i) $4,000 MX or less; ii) $4,001 MX to $7,000 MX; iii)
$7,001 MX to $10,000 MX; iv) $10,001 MX to $15,000 MX; v) $15,001 MX to $20,000 MX; and vi) more
than $20,000 MX.
19The statistics displayed in Table 3 are generated trimming the top 1% and the bottom 1% of the earnings
expectations, but the balancing properties still hold in the untrimmed sample.
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average, a girl in the control group expects to earn $4,101 MX, as opposed to an average
estimated wage of $4,827 MX for a woman with high school degree between 30 and 40 years
old, according to ENOE. The average expected wage for the average woman is $3,154 MX.
Comparing the mean expected wages with observed values might not be particularly
meaningful in the presence of highly skewed expected income distributions. In order to better
understand the extent of the misperceptions, we discretize the baseline answer applying
the thresholds used in the follow-up data source - i.e. 12th grade ENLACE de Contexto.
Figures 2 plots the distribution of expected wages (self) at the baseline against the observed
distribution in the 2009 ENOE separately for boys and girls. The largest difference between
perceived and observed earnings realizations are concentrated in the first two bins of the
distribution; the fraction of both boys and girls who think that they will earn less than
$4,000 MX is much larger than the actual fraction of high school graduates earning 4,000
or less in the second trimester of 2009. For earnings higher than $7,000 MX we do not
observe significant differences between the distribution of the expected earnings (self) and
the current ones. The extent of this misperception becomes even more evident when we
consider the distribution of the expected earnings of an average person between 30 and 40
and compare it with ENOE (Fig. AI).
Both for boys and girls the income expectations upon completing university are on average
higher than the wages observed for a university graduate between 30 and 40 years old, as
measured in the ENOE data. This is true irrespective of whether or not we consider the
income expectation for oneself or for the average person.
In summary, the average perception on the wages that each of them can earn upon com-
pleting upper secondary is aligned with the average wage observed in the labor market.
However, there is a large fraction of boys and girls who tend to underestimate the earnings
of a high school graduate in the labor market. According the to the baseline survey, 79% of
the respondents mentioned family members as one of the three main sources of information
about the benefits of studying, followed by television (70%) and internet (48%). In order to
provide prima facie evidence on the link between expected earnings and school performance,
Table 4 shows the correlation between baseline expectations about future earnings, expressed
in logarithms, and follow-up outcomes for the individuals in control schools. The correlation
between the expected log earning upon completing either upper secondary or tertiary educa-
tion and the probability of being identified in the 2012 ENLACE 12th grade is small and not
statistically significant, regardless of whether or not we consider the expectations for oneself
or the average person. We do find evidence of a significant correlation between the expected
earnings and the results in math and Spanish. The correlation is particularly strong and
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statistically significant when we consider the expectations for oneself (columns 5-6 and 9-10
in Table 4), rather than for the average person. Although the association does not have
any causal interpretation, it does suggest that expectations of students upon entering high
school, especially the ones for oneself, do bear some relation to final performance.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Econometric Model
To estimate the causal impact of providing information about the labor market returns of
educational attainments, we estimate the following equation:
Yij = β0 + β1Dj + γ
′Xij + uij (3)
where Yij is the outcome of student i in school j recorded in the follow-up survey. Dj is
an indicator dummy that takes the value one if school j is assigned to the treatment group,
0 otherwise. β1 measures the average treatment on the treated (ATT) effect of receiving the
information in the modalities explained above. Let Xij be a vector of baseline covariates
measured at the individual and school level. In our main specification, Xij includes the
macro-regions where the school is located (north, center and south) - the level at which
the randomization has been stratified, dummies for the type of specialization of the school
(industrial, agricultural, or ocean-related), age and gender of the student, dummies for the
level of proficiency in math and Spanish in the 9th grade ENLACE, and dummies for whether
the 9th grade scores in math or Spanish are missing, dummies for whether the mother and
the father work, dummies for whether the information on father’s and mother’s work status
is missing, dummies to proxy for the presence PC and internet at home. In order to reduce
the potential efficiency losses due to the multilevel design of our sampling - at least two
classrooms were randomly selected both in treatment and control schools - we follow Cameron
and Miller (2015) and in our main specifications we use a Feasible Generalized Least Square
(FGLS) estimator. The results from the standard OLS, although slightly less precise, are in
line with those presented and are available upon request. In all the specifications, standard
errors are clustered at school level to account for correlated shocks within schools, that
represent the level at which the treatment is assigned.
Both for math and Spanish, we standardize all the scores using the mean and the standard
deviation observed in the control group. In order to address the inference issues related to
the presence of multiple learning outcomes (Kling et al. 2007), we also consider the effect
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on the average test score, as defined by the average of the standardized scores in math and
Spanish.
When we study how the treatment effect varies along individual and household charac-
teristics, the results are based on fully interacted models.
4.2 Results on Education Outcomes
In this section we describe the results of our experiment on the four main education outcomes:
the probability of taking the 12th grade ENLACE on time - i.e. three years after the start
of upper secondary, standardized Spanish test score, standardized math test score and the
average of the two. In Table 5 we present the ATT effects for the whole sample. In the
odd columns we present the results for the specification that only controls for the strata
dummies, in the even columns we show the results of our main specification with the full set
of controls.
Receiving information about returns to education had a positive, but not statistically
significant effect (coeff. 0.025 and standard error 0.042) on the probability of taking the
ENLACE test in 2012, thus suggesting that the intervention did not affect on-time high
school completion. In principle, if information about school returns is increasing students’
incentives, we might have expected a higher probability of completing high school on time.
We next consider the effect on students’ learning outcomes. The results are presented
in columns 3 to 8 in Table 5. The treatment effect is equal to 0.16σ and not statistically
significant for Spanish and 0.32σ and marginally significant for math when we only control
for the strata dummies. For the average of the two scores, we find an effect of 0.24σ,
statistically significant at 10% level. When we include the full set of controls, the effect of
the information treatment is equal to 0.10σ (not statistically significant) for Spanish, 0.29σ
for math (significant at 5%) and 0.20σ (significant at 10%) for the average score. Since we
found no impact of the intervention on the probability of taking the ENLACE exam, it is
unlikely that the effect on test scores are driven by differential selection into the ENLACE
exam in treatment and control schools.
We next consider how the treatment effect varies with three important dimensions: gen-
der, ability and household income. The experiment was not designed to be representative
at any of this level. Therefore our results have to be interpreted as suggestive, rather than
conclusive.
The intervention provided both boys and girls with gender specific measures of the returns
to human capital investment and its potential time horizon.20 We study whether boys and
20Increased life expectancy should increase the incentive to invest in schooling since a longer time horizon
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girls responded differentially to the information provision. Results are presented in Panel
A in Table 6. In the control group, girls are more likely to take the test than boys (63%
vs 57%). Nevertheless, the effect of the information treatment on the probability of taking
ENLACE 12th grade on time is basically null for both boys and girls. In the control group,
12th grade girls’ scores in language are better then boys’ but their scores in math are about
0.40σ lower than for boys. This is somehow striking since the 9th grade score in math of
the girls in the control group was 533 points as opposed to the 525 points for boys (see
bottom panel in Table 2).21 When we look at the impact of the information treatment
on learning outcomes, for boys we find no effect on Spanish test scores, and a moderate
and marginally significant increase in math scores (0.24σ). For girls we find a moderate
positive effect on scores in Spanish (0.17σ marginally significant at 10% level) and a large
(0.34σ) and statistically significant impact on math scores. These impacts translate into
a 0.26σ (statistically significant at 5% level) increase in the average score for girls, and
0.15σ statistically not significant increase for boys. We can reject the null hypothesis of no
gender-differentiated effect on the average learning score (p-value=0.043)
According to SEP, students are classified in one of the following proficiency levels: a)
insufficient, b) regular, c) good, and d) excellent, based on their ENLACE result. About
16% and 30% of the students in our sample taking 9th grade ENLACE were classified as
insufficient in Spanish and math respectively. The 9th grade ENLACE proficiency level is a
strong predictor of dropping out of upper secondary. In the control group, 40% of students
with an insufficient 9th grade ENLACE math were not identified in 12th grade ENLACE,
as opposed to 23% among those with a level of regular or more. We study the effect of
the information for three different groups: a) those with an insufficient 9th grade ENLACE
(henceforth low-ability students) in math, b) those with an ENLACE math score regular
or better (henceforth high-ability students), c) those with a missing 9th grade ENLACE
score.22 Results are reported in Panel B in Table 6. The effect on the proxy for probability
of finishing upper secondary on time is not statistically different from zero across the three
sub-groups. When we look at learning outcomes, we find that among low-ability students,
the effect is 0.04σ for Spanish and 0.25σ for math. For both subjects, the effect is not
statistically different from zero. For those with an ENLACE proficiency level of regular or
more, we find a large effect both on Spanish and math, 0.15σ and 0.33σ respectively, with
increases the value of investments that pay out over time.
21As shown in Table 1, the gender differences in 9th grade scores observed in our sample are in line with
the nation wide difference reported in Table 1.
22Table AII displays the balancing properties between treatment and control group in each of the three
subgroups. All the results reported in the paper are based on the student 9th grade classification in math,
but they do not change when we use Spanish (results available upon request).
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the average effect on test score being statistically significant. Nevertheless, when we compare
whether the program had a differential effect on the average learning score, we cannot reject
that the effect for the low ability is the same as for high ability ones (p-value=0.18) and
for missing ability ones (p-value=0.31). In summary, although we find larger coefficients for
high-ability students than low-ability ones, we do not have enough statical power to rule out
that the effect does not vary with initial level of ability.
We repeat a similar exercise using household income. We define as “high HH income”
those students who report a monthly household income in the bracket between $3,501 MX
and $7,000 MX or above, while those who report an income in a lower bracket are classified
as “low HH income”.23 Results are reported in Panel C in Table 6. Household income
does not affect the program’s effect on the probability of taking the 12th grade ENLACE
exam. The treatment effects on learning outcomes among low income students are not
statistically different from zero, although the size of the effect is nontrivial for the math
score (0.20σ). Among high income students the effect is positive and marginally significant
on Spanish (0.18σ) and large for math (0.32σ). When we consider the effect on the average
learning score, we find a 0.12σ increase among low income students, as opposed to a 0.25σ
(statistically significant at 5%) among high income students, and a 0.18σ increase among
missing income students. We can reject the null hypothesis of no differential effect between
low and high income students (p-value=0.029), while we can not reject when we compare
low income students with those who do not report income information.
In summary, we found larger effects on the learning outcomes of girls than boys, mostly
driven by a particularly large impact on the math score. We found no significant evidence
of treatment heterogeneity in students’ ability, but significant differences associated with
household income. The fact that we found an effect only among high income students
makes unlikely that the average impacts that we find are driven by the infomation about the
PRONABES higher education scholarship. As discussed in section 2.1, PRONABES only
targets students with monthly household income below three minimum wages.
4.3 Results on Self-reported Effort
In the simple theoretical framework outlined in section 3.1, information improves student’s
performance through an increase in the level of effort. While objective measures of effort are
not available, we use the self-reported measure of effort elicited in the 12th grade ENLACE
de contexto (described in section 3.3) to provide some preliminary evidence on whether the
intervention induced students to work harder. 26% of the boys, as opposed to 18% of the
23In 2012, the median price adjusted household income was $4,880 MX.
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girls, in the control group report that the statement “I am a person who works hard in school”
describes them fully, while for 24% of the boys and 23% of the girls the statement describes
them a lot.
The major concern when using self-reported measures in a context like ours is the pos-
sibility of social desirability bias: students in the treatment group might be more likely to
reply in a way that will be viewed favorably by the others. The measure of self-reported ef-
fort that we use was collected almost three years after the intervention as part of a standard
nationally administered survey, and it is therefore unlikely that students could bias their
response as result of the information treatment. In general, self-reported data might capture
poorly the actual level of effort. In order to boost confidence in our measure, we use data
from the control group to measure the correlation between the self-reported level of effort
and the 2012 ENLACE results in math and Spanish. One standard deviation increase in
self-reported effort leads to a 0.11σ increase in math and 0.12σ in Spanish. Both correlations
are statistically significant at conventional levels (results available upon request).
We use eq. 3 to study the impact of the information treatment on self-reported levels of
effort. In order to simplify the interpretation of the results, we standardize the categorical
variable using the mean and the standard deviation observed in the control group. Results
are presented in Table 7. In column 1 we present the results for the entire sample. Overall
the treatment group reports a level of effort that is 0.24σ (statistically significant at 1%
level) higher than for the control group. In column 2, we consider the effect by gender and
we find much larger impact for girls (0.35σ) than for boys (0.11σ). We can marginally reject
the null hypothesis of no differential effect by gender (p-value=0.07). In column 3 we study
how the effect on self-reported effort varies with the level of ability. We do find increases in
effort for all three subgroups discussed above (high- and low-ability students and those with
no 9th grade ENLACE). The increase among low-ability students is larger in size (0.29σ)
than among high-ability students (0.16σ). However, when testing whether the effect varies
across the three subgroups, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no differential effect.
In column 4 we show how the effect varies with household income. Both for low and high
income students we find large effects of the information package and also in this case we can
not reject the null hypothesis of no differential effect.
Although the self-reported nature of the data requires a cautious interpretation of the
results presented in this section, the information intervention seems to have improved stu-
dents’ intrinsic motivation, irrespective of their ability level and their income level. The fact
that learning outcomes only increase among high income students, although both high and
low income students report higher self-reported effort, is consistent with the hypothesis that
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an increase in effort can translate into better learning outcomes only when complemented
with other inputs provided at home. An alternative explanation is that only students from
relatively well-off backgrounds know how to translate increased effort into better outcomes.
We do find instead that boys and girls respond differentially to the intervention, with the
latter reporting higher levels of effort after receiving the information package. Therefore the
gender-differentiated effect on learning outcomes documented in section 4.2 can be potentially
explained by the differential effect on effort.
5 Further Evidence on the Gender Heterogeneity
The results presented so far show that girls respond to the provision of information by
increasing their effort and, as a result, they display a large increase in test scores. For
boys, we find instead small and not statistically significant increases in self-reported effort
and learning outcomes. In this section we further discuss the differential response of boys
and girls, and provide some suggestive evidence on the possible mechanisms behind these
differences.
First, we study if both boys and girls update their beliefs in response to the information
treatment. For this purpose, we rely on the information elicited as part of the 12th grade
ENLACE de contexto. Two different types of caveats should be taken into account when
comparing the expected earnings collected at the baseline and at the follow-up. As already
mentioned, the ENLACE de contexto only collects information among 20% of the entire
population of exam takers. Given the large share of students who dropped out before taking
the 12th grade ENLACE, the populations of exam takers and non-takers might differ along
both observable and unobservable characteristics. This has the potential to introduce a
selection bias. Due to the randomized assignment of the intervention, the selection bias
will not affect the internal validity of our results as long as it enters eq. 3 additively.
Nevertheless, the external validity might be limited. Second, while the question regarding
wage expectations included in the 12th grade ENLACE de contexto reads exactly as the
question included in the baseline survey, the answer only allows the choice between the six
options described in section 3.4. In Fig. 3 we plot the distributions of expected earnings in
the treatment and the control group both for boys and girls in the follow-up. Compared to
the baseline, there is a higher proportion of boys and girls in the control group reporting
an expected income in the bin where the observed average earnings fall. This might be
the result either of the selection into the exam taking, or improved information as students
approach the end of high school.
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We observe a reduction in the probability of reporting an expected income (oneself)
lower than $4,000 MX among boys and girls in the treatment group, compared to those in the
control group. Among girls in the treatment group, we observe an increase in the probability
of reporting an expected income between $4,000 and $7,000 MX, and no changes in the
probability of reporting an expected income above $7,000. Among boys in the treatment
group, we instead observe no change in the probability of reporting an expected income
between $4,000 and $7,000 MX, but an increase in the probability of reporting an expected
income in all the bins above $7,000 MX. The graphical evidence is supported by the regression
results presented in Table 8. In summary, both boys and girls seem to update their beliefs in
response to the information received as part of the intervention. However, while girls adjust
their perceptions in line with the statistics provided, a significant fraction of boys report
values higher than information provided by ENOE.
It is puzzling that while both boys and girls update upwards their perceptions regard-
ing the monetary benefits of finishing EMS, only girls report higher effort. We next assess
whether more objectives measures of effort support this conclusion. Until 2012, students at-
tending technological EMS schools could choose among three different subtracks: 1) physics
and mathematics, 2) economics and accounting, and 3) chemistry and biology.24 Each sub-
track has a large set of optional courses, and among those, students have to choose two (for
a total of ten weekly hours) during the last semester of high school. The subtrack of physics
and mathematics is the one with the widest choice of math related courses, followed by the
economics and accounting, and chemistry and biology.
We compare the school subtrack distribution for boys and girls in treatment and con-
trol schools. Results are reported in Table 9. Among boys we do not find any significant
difference in the subtrack distribution between treatment and control groups; a vast major-
ity of students prefer the physics and mathematics subtrack (48%) followed by economics
(20%) and chemistry (13%). For girls, the percentage of students who prefer physics and
mathematics is 27% and is not statistically different in the treatment and the control group.
We do find instead a much larger fraction of girls undertaking economics in the treatment
groups (35%) vis-a-vis the control one (19%), with a consequential reduction in the uptake
of chemistry and biology. A Kolmogorov Smirnov test allows us to reject the null hypoth-
esis that the subtrack distribution is the same in the treatment and the control group for
girls, but we can not reject the null hypothesis for boys. This evidence shows that one of
the mechanisms linking the information treatment with improved learning outcomes among
24Starting from 2012, as part of a major curriculum reform, students can have a fourth optional subtrack,
that covers humanities and social sciences subjects (for details see http://cosdac.sems.gob.mx/riems.php).
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girls took place via a change in their subtrack choices. One possible explanation for this
result that the available data did not allow us to test, is that our intervention motivated
female students to search for more detailed information about the wages related to different
careers and, as a result, opted for subtracks with higher expected returns but potentially
more demanding. Since 2005 Mexico has a nationwide employment observatory (Observato-
rio Laboral - OLA) that provides updated information on the main labor market outcomes
of the different careers - including average wage and gender composition, and it can be easily
accessed through a webpage.25
It is unclear why boys did not change their behavior, in spite of a more optimistic view
about their returns to education. Following our simple conceptual framework, there are
two potential explanations: 1) the distance between the perceived returns and the statistic
provided as part of the intervention differs for boys and girls; 2) boys and girls have different
time preferences.
Only students with expected returns below the statistic provided as part of the interven-
tion should increase effort and improve their results. At the baseline boys and girls do not
statistically differ in the probability of reporting an expected earning below the average earn-
ing estimated with the ENOE (72% and 70% respectively), and therefore it is unlikely that
difference in the baseline perceptions about future earnings can drive the gender differential
effect of the information package on proxies for effort, and learning outcomes.
Lower time discount should lead to an increased impact of the program on effort. There
is increasing evidence that men and women differ in time discount.26 In the baseline survey
we elicited information on time preference using a framework similar to the one used by
Rubalcava et al. (2009) and described in section 3.2. Consistent with their results, we find
that 20% of boys, as opposed to 15% of girls, would prefer accepting $3,000 MX today,
regardless of the amount offered in one year time. We define these individuals as the "high
time discount" students, and "low time discount" as all students willing to give up the $3,000
MX today in exchange for a larger sum in the future. We study whether the treatment effect
25According to the public information provided by the OLA in 2014, a nurse, one of the most common
professional outcomes for students choosing the chemistry and biology subtrack, receives on average $8,617
MX per month and 87% of the nurses are female. The average wage for a clerk is $10,215 MX and $10,212 MX
for an accountant, two common outcomes for those opting for an economics and administration subtrack.
Among clerks and accountants, women account for 49.3% and 46.4% of the total employees respectively.
Careers such as engineering, that are common outcomes for those taking the physics and mathematics
subtrack, feature on average the highest wages but an extremely low proportion of women. The average
wages for a mining engineer and an automotive one are $19,838 MX and $14,036 MX per month respectively,
but the percentage of women employed are 11.4% and 1.3%, respectively.
26See, among others, Dittrich and Leipold (2014) and Bauer et al. (2012). For Mexico, Rubalcava et al.
(2009), using direct evidence on time preference from the Mexican Family Life Survey, finds that women
have lower time discount than men.
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varies with proxies for time discount. The evidence presented in column 1 in Table 10 shows
that low time discount students display a very large and significant increase in self-reported
effort, as opposed to a zero impact among the high discount students. Point estimates on
the average learning score show larger coefficients for low time discount than high discount
students (column 2 in Table 10), but we can not reject the null hypothesis of no differential
effect.
In summary, both boys and girls update their priors about the labor market returns to
education, but only the latter exert more effort, partly by choosing subtracks with higher
mathematical content. We provide some suggestive evidence that part of the difference might
be explained by gender differences in time preferences. However, given the small difference in
the proportion of high discount students among boys and girls, and the fact that we can not
reject the hypothesis that the effect on learning is the same for high and low time discount
students, we conclude that the role of time preferences in explaining the gender-differentiated
effect on learning is at most small.
There might be alternative explanations behind the gender-specific response to the in-
formation treatment. Information about future returns to children’s education might in
principle affect parental expectations and, as a result, their investments into their children’s
human capital. Parents might invest more in girls if they were underestimating their future
labor market returns.27 Similarly, teachers in treatment schools might have increased their
effort, possibly as a result of a Hawthorne effect, but it is unclear why this would have a
differential effect on boys and girls. We test whether the intervention led to teachers’ and
parents’ responses that differ with student gender. In the ENLACE de contexto students
are asked a series of questions about their math teachers’ practices and parental investment.
Evidence presented in Table 11 shows no effect of the program on students’ perceptions
about teacher practices and parental involvement, either for boys or girls.
One conjecture behind the gender-specific effect of the intervention is that, ex-ante, boys
might have had a lower scope for improving their effort through the subtrack choice. The
fact that in the control group almost half of the boys, as opposed to 26% of the women, were
opting for the most difficult subtrack, and they have math results 0.4σ higher than girls
- while girls were doing better than boys in 9th grade - is suggestive that, at least in our
sample, boys are already exerting a higher level of effort compared to girls, at least regarding
math. This difference might be either the result of different preferences - for instance boys
are less risk averse than girls (Charness and Gneezy 2012) and they are willing to attend more
27Bharadwaj et al. (2012), using data from Chile, find that parents invest more in math for boys, while
the reverse is true for reading.
21
difficult subtracks - or social norms. On the one hand, irrespective of how well informed they
are, boys who decide to attend a technological high school are expected to choose careers
that require high mathematical competence (e.g. engineering), and they might internalize
these expectations by increasing their level of effort in math-related subjects. On the other
hand, it has been shown for Mexico that girls’ expectations and aspirations regarding the
quality of the potential partner and family formation are predominant in their schooling
decisions (Attanasio and Kaufmann 2012a), and this might explain why they stay away
from the most difficult subtracks. The information intervention might have helped girls not
only to improve their level of awareness, but also to give more salience to the labor market
returns when deciding the optimal level of effort in school.
6 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
When entering high school, students face important decisions that can have long lasting con-
sequences on their education and labor market trajectories. Often these decisions are taken
without an adequate level of information, especially in the context of a developing country.
We study the impact of an intervention that targets 10th grade students in Mexico and
provides them information about the returns to upper secondary and tertiary education, as
well as a source of financial aid for tertiary education and life expectancy. The Percepciones
pilot displayed no impact on the probability of on-time high school graduation. This can
be explained, at least partly, by the fact that the information intervention seems to have
a larger impact among students who display a minimum level of socioeconomic conditions,
that most high school dropouts miss.
The intervention had a sizeable positive effect on learning outcomes, with the average
of the standardized scores in math and Spanish increasing by 0.2 standard deviations. The
intervention had a very heterogeneous impact. Almost three years after being exposed to the
treatment, girls who received the intervention experienced a large increase in their scores,
especially the math one. Similarly, we find that students with relatively better socioeconomic
conditions display significantly higher impacts.
Both boys and girls in the treatment group update their beliefs about the returns to
education, but only the latter report increased effort and switch to more demanding and
math-intensive subtracks. Although our study was not designed to analyze a gender differ-
ential impact, the available data do allow to test whether some of the mechanisms previously
mentioned by the literature can operate in our context. Initial level of information and po-
tential gender biased behaviors of parents and teachers do not seem to play any role in
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explaining our results. Differences in time preferences can explain very little, if anything, of
the gender differentiated effect of the intervention.
The results presented in this paper also show that a pure informational treatment is not
an effective strategy to reduce upper secondary dropout rates in Mexico and are not able
to improve learning outcomes among students from disadvantaged backgrounds, since the
increase in effort has to be complemented by other inputs. However, given the large effect
on math test scores for girls and high-ability students, as well as the virtually zero cost
of the intervention, the results presented in this study support previous findings showing
the cost-effectiveness of information interventions. For many adolescent girls in Mexico,
information could be enough to help them visualize a future different from the traditional
stereotypes, and base their present schooling decisions and efforts on their potential labor
market implications.
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Figure 1: Timeline of the Percepciones Project
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Figure 2: Baseline Monthly Expected Earnings (Self) upon finishing Upper Secondary
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Figure 3: Follow-up Monthly Expected Earnings (Self) upon finishing Upper Secondary
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Note: The red line is in correspondence with the statistic provided to the students in the treatment group, and it is equal to the
average monthly earning for high school graduates aged between 30 and 40 using data from ENOE second quarter of 2009. The
observed distribution is based on data from ENOE second quarter of 2009. The baseline expected earnings for themselves upon
finishing upper secondary were elicited as part of the baseline survey conducted in November 2009. The follow-up monthly
expected earnings for themselves were elicited as part of the 2012 ENLACE de contexto, that is administered to 20% of the
12th grade ENLACE exam takers.
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Table 1: Evolution of Gender Differences in
Learning in Mexico
Boys Girls Total Observations
ENLACE 6th Grade
Spanish 497.115 528.142 512.425 1,985,852
(104.940) (102.914) (105.097)
Math 505.488 522.422 513.844 1,985,852
(112.061) (108.299) (110.545)
ENLACE 9th Grade
Spanish 491.835 523.131 507.953 1,389,773
(103.799) (102.705) (104.415)
Math 520.628 529.398 525.145 1,389,773
(113.688) (105.173) (109.473)
ENLACE 12th Grade
Spanish 498.914 523.697 512.379 630,311
(96.632) (88.927) (93.345)
Math 600.302 570.487 584.103 629,975
(118.871) (114.853) (117.646)
Note: We report the mean of each variable, and its standard
deviation in parentheses. The sample includes the individuals
who took the ENLACE 6th grade in 2007 nationwide, and
we follow them through 9th grade (in 2010) and 12th grade
(2013).
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Table 2: Baseline characteristics, by Treatment status
Full Sample Boys Girls
T C p-value T C p-value T C p-value
T=C T=C T=C
Panel A: Survey variables
Age 16.5 16.5 0.940 16.6 16.6 0.778 16.4 16.4 0.866
(0.932) (0.788) (0.982) (0.882) (0.868) (0.662)
People in the hh 5.16 5.23 0.526 5.17 5.2 0.736 5.16 5.27 0.421
(1.74) (1.76) (1.75) (1.64) (1.74) (1.87)
Father works 0.944 0.932 0.206 0.958 0.931 0.001 0.927 0.934 0.648
(0.231) (0.252) (0.2) (0.254) (0.261) (0.249)
Mom works 0.493 0.459 0.234 0.472 0.445 0.479 0.516 0.473 0.126
(0.5) (0.498) (0.499) (0.497) (0.5) (0.5)
Father with primary 0.286 0.319 0.448 0.26 0.298 0.432 0.314 0.342 0.554
(0.452) (0.466) (0.439) (0.458) (0.464) (0.475)
Mother with primary 0.303 0.342 0.357 0.282 0.329 0.308 0.326 0.354 0.474
(0.46) (0.474) (0.45) (0.47) (0.469) (0.479)
Father with secondary 0.363 0.369 0.813 0.367 0.371 0.844 0.358 0.366 0.835
(0.481) (0.483) (0.482) (0.483) (0.48) (0.482)
Mother with secondary 0.392 0.416 0.283 0.396 0.403 0.684 0.388 0.43 0.191
(0.488) (0.493) (0.489) (0.491) (0.488) (0.495)
Father with hs or higher 0.351 0.312 0.338 0.372 0.331 0.338 0.328 0.292 0.410
(0.478) (0.463) (0.484) (0.471) (0.47) (0.455)
Mother with hs or higher 0.305 0.242 0.118 0.322 0.268 0.187 0.286 0.216 0.115
(0.46) (0.428) (0.468) (0.443) (0.452) (0.411)
Heater at Home 0.663 0.598 0.333 0.701 0.596 0.145 0.622 0.601 0.706
(0.473) (0.49) (0.458) (0.491) (0.485) (0.49)
Washing Machine 0.795 0.778 0.677 0.824 0.798 0.484 0.764 0.758 0.877
(0.403) (0.416) (0.381) (0.402) (0.425) (0.429)
PC at Home 0.605 0.521 0.122 0.632 0.551 0.125 0.576 0.49 0.154
(0.489) (0.5) (0.482) (0.498) (0.494) (0.5)
Internet at Home 0.443 0.354 0.142 0.46 0.382 0.201 0.425 0.325 0.125
(0.497) (0.478) (0.499) (0.486) (0.495) (0.469)
Hours for homeworks 5.5 5.37 0.641 5.58 5.62 1.000 5.41 5.11 0.357
(5.89) (5.64) (6.2) (6.23) (5.53) (4.95)
School days missed 2.58 2.79 0.158 2.7 2.8 0.644 2.45 2.78 0.132
(2.3) (2.41) (2.39) (2.42) (2.2) (2.41)
Sec. school qualification 8.52 8.44 0.326 8.37 8.24 0.120 8.68 8.65 0.698
(0.812) (0.82) (0.817) (0.803) (0.776) (0.786)
Failed subject in sec. 0.229 0.243 0.569 0.287 0.297 0.810 0.165 0.188 0.331
(0.42) (0.429) (0.452) (0.457) (0.372) (0.391)
Panel B: 9th grade ENLACE results
Missing ENLACE 0.216 0.282 0.071 0.241 0.292 0.181 0.188 0.271 0.054
(0.411) (0.45) (0.428) (0.455) (0.391) (0.445)
Spanish Score 533 524 0.522 517 507 0.404 549 542 0.680
(98.8) (96.5) (97.4) (96.9) (97.8) (92.8)
Insufficient in Spanish 0.205 0.195 0.739 0.236 0.237 0.954 0.171 0.152 0.504
(0.404) (0.397) (0.425) (0.426) (0.377) (0.359)
Math Score 542 529 0.343 538 525 0.365 546 533 0.380
(104) (97.4) (104) (99) (104) (95.6)
Insufficient in Math 0.362 0.359 0.933 0.359 0.364 0.895 0.364 0.353 0.796
(0.481) (0.48) (0.48) (0.481) (0.481) (0.478)
Note: We report the mean of each variable, and its standard deviation in parentheses. The p-value on the test of
equality is based on an OLS regression of the outcome of interest regressed on the treatment dummy and the strata
dummies, with standard errors clustered at school level.
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Table 5: Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome Variable ENLACE (Y/N) Spanish Math Average Score
Treatment 0.025 0.004 0.161 0.107 0.322* 0.285** 0.242* 0.198*
(0.042) (0.029) (0.134) (0.096) (0.170) (0.140) (0.139) (0.104)
Strata Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 4145 4131 2531 2520 2531 2520 2531 2520
Mean Dep. Control Group 0.598 0.598 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SD Dep. Control Group 0.490 0.490 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.884 0.884
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at school level in parentheses. Strata dummies are the dummies for
the 3 macro regions (North, Center, South) that is the level at which the randomization has been stratified.
Controls include age, a dummy for gender, dummies for the type of specialization of the school (industrial,
agricultural, or ocean-related), dummies for the level of proficiency in math and Spanish in the 9th grade
ENLACE, and dummies for whether the 9th grade score in math and Spanish are missing, dummies for
whether the mother and the father work, dummies for whether the information on father’s and mother’s work
status are missing, dummies to proxy for the presence PC and internet at home. Has ENLACE 12th grade
takes the value 1 if the student took the 12th grade exam in 2012, 0 otherwise. Spanish and Math refer to
the 12 grade ENLACE scores in Spanish and math in 2012 and they have been normalized with respect to
the mean and the standard deviation in the control group. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at
the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 6: Treatment Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Variable Took ENLACE 12th grade (Y/N) Spanish Math Average Score
Panel A
Heterogeneity by Gender
Treat X Male -0.001 0.059 0.237* 0.151
(0.032) (0.105) (0.139) (0.108)
Treat X Female 0.011 0.167* 0.338** 0.255**
(0.034) (0.093) (0.144) (0.104)
Strata Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4131 2520 2520 2520
P-Value H0: Boys=Girls 0.693 0.098 0.102 0.043
Panel B
Heterogeneity by Ability
Treatment X Low Ability -0.018 0.039 0.246 0.146
(0.043) (0.117) (0.169) (0.127)
Treatment X High Ability 0.022 0.152 0.333*** 0.241**
(0.027) (0.098) (0.129) (0.102)
Treatment X Missing Ability 0.006 0.141 0.365* 0.263
(0.044) (0.182) (0.188) (0.167)
Strata Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4131 2520 2520 2520
P-Value H0: Low Ability=High Ability 0.261 0.161 0.314 0.180
P-Value H0: Low Ability=Missing 0.598 0.459 0.276 0.309
Panel C
Heterogeneity by HH Income
Treatment X Low Income 0.011 0.046 0.198 0.124
(0.035) (0.098) (0.148) (0.107)
Treatment X High Income -0.005 0.178* 0.322** 0.253**
(0.029) (0.104) (0.135) (0.105)
Treatment X Missing Income 0.019 -0.030 0.379** 0.179
(0.043) (0.131) (0.184) (0.143)
Strata Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4131 2520 2520 2520
P-Value H0: Low Income=High Income 0.493 0.064 0.060 0.029
P-Value H0: Low Income=Missing 0.859 0.470 0.143 0.592
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at school level in parentheses. Strata dummies are the dummies for the
3 macro regions (North, Center, South) that is the level at which the randomization has been stratified. Controls
include age, a dummy for gender, dummies for the type of specialization of the school (industrial, agricultural, or
ocean-related), dummies for the level of proficiency in math and Spanish in the 9th grade ENLACE, and dummies
for whether the 9th grade score in math and Spanish are missing, dummies for whether the mother and the father
work, dummies for whether the information on father’s and mother’s work status are missing, dummies to proxy for
the presence PC and internet at home. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant
at the 10% level.
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Table 7: Impact on Self-reported Effort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Gender Ability HH Income
Treat 0.240***
(0.027)
Treat X Male 0.110
(0.094)
Treat X Female 0.349***
(0.060)
Treat X Low Ability 0.297 ***
(0.080)
Treat X High Ability 0.156*
(0.082)
Treat X Missing Ability 0.194
(0.161)
Treat X Low Income 0.222 ***
(0.078)
Treat X High Income 0.303 ***
(0.071)
Treat X Missing Income 0.054
(0.174)
Strata Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 724 724 724 724
Mean Dep. Control Group -0.000
SD Dep. Control Group 1.000
P-Value H0: Boys=Girls 0.071
P-Value H0: Low Ability=High Ability 0.359
P-Value H0: Low Ability=Missing 0.526
P-Value H0: Low Income=High Income 0.477
P-Value H0: Low Income=Missing 0.320
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at school level in parentheses. Strata dummies are
the dummies for the 3 macro regions (North, Center, South) that is the level at which the
randomization has been stratified.Strata dummies are the dummies for the 3 macro regions
(North, Center, South) that is the level at which the randomization has been stratified. Con-
trols include age, a dummy for gender, dummies for the type of specialization of the school
(industrial, agricultural, or ocean-related), dummies for the level of proficiency in math and
Spanish in the 9th grade ENLACE, and dummies for whether the 9th grade score in math
and Spanish are missing, dummies for whether the mother and the father work, dummies for
whether the information on father’s and mother’s work status are missing, dummies to proxy
for the presence PC and internet at home. The self-reported effort has been standardized with
respect to the mean and the standard deviation in the control group. *** Significant at the
1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 8: Effect on Perceived Earnings
(1) (2) (3)
Less than 4,000 Between 4,000 and 7,000 Above 7,000
Treat X Male -0.171*** 0.005 0.155 ***
(0.051) (0.034) (0.047)
Treat X Female -0.102 0.072 *** 0.023
(0.067) (0.023) (0.054)
Strata Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 726 726 726
Mean Dep. Control Group 0.338 0.287 0.375
SD Dep. Control Group 0.475 0.454 0.486
P-Value H0: Boys=Girls 0.163 0.103 0.018
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at school level in parentheses. Strata dummies are
the dummies for the 3 macro regions (North, Center, South) that is the level at which the
randomization has been stratified. Controls include age, a dummy for gender, dummies
for the type of specialization of the school (industrial, agricultural, or ocean-related),
dummies for the level of proficiency in math and Spanish in the 9th grade ENLACE,
and dummies for whether the 9th grade score in math and Spanish are missing, dummies
for whether the mother and the father work, dummies for whether the information on
father’s and mother’s work status are missing, dummies to proxy for the presence PC and
internet at home. The dummy Less than $4,000 MX takes the value 1 for an expected
monthly earning below $4,000 MX upon finishing upper secondary, 0 otherwise. The
dummy Between $4,000 MX and $7,000 MX takes the value 1 for an expected monthly
earning between $4,000 MX and $7,000 MX upon finishing upper secondary, 0 otherwise.
The dummy More than $7,000 MX takes the value 1 for an expected earning above
$7,000 MX upon finishing upper secondary, 0 otherwise. *** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
Table 9: Subtrack Distribution
Boys Girls
Control Treatment Total Control Treatment Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
None 21.64% 17.87% 19.35% 20.90% 22.22% 21.75%
Physics and Mathematics 48.51% 47.83% 48.09% 29.10% 25.51% 26.79%
Chemistry and Biology 13.43% 12.08% 12.61% 31.34% 16.87% 22.02%
Economics and Administration 16.42% 22.22% 19.94% 18.66% 35.39% 29.44%
Observations 134 207 341 134 243 377
K-S Test=0.059 p-value = 0.95 K-S Test=0.167 p-value = 0.016
Note: The bottom line reports the Kolmogorov Smirnov test, and the p-value for the null hypothesis of equality of
distributions.
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Figure AI: Baseline Monthly Expected Earnings (Average) upon finishing Upper
Secondary
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Note: The red line is in correspondence with the statistic provided to the students in the treatment group, and
it is equal to the average monthly earning for high school graduates aged between 30 and 40 using data from
ENOE second quarter of 2009. The observed distribution is based on data from the ENOE second quarter of 2009.
The baseline expected earnings for the average person upon finishing upper secondary were elicited as part of the
baseline survey conducted in November 2009.
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Table AI: Comparing Characteristics of
Matched and Unmatched Observations
Matched Unmatched p-value
M=U
(1) (2) (3)
Age 16.4 16.7 0.000
(0.665) (1.27)
People in the hh 5.17 5.3 0.033
(1.74) (1.78)
Father works 0.934 0.949 0.110
(0.248) (0.221)
Mother works 0.482 0.457 0.229
(0.5) (0.498)
Father with primary 0.302 0.305 0.917
(0.459) (0.461)
Mother with primary 0.319 0.334 0.502
(0.466) (0.472)
Father with secondary 0.36 0.385 0.354
(0.48) (0.487)
Mother with secondary 0.394 0.435 0.108
(0.489) (0.496)
Father with hs or higher 0.338 0.31 0.194
(0.473) (0.463)
Mother with hs or higher 0.287 0.231 0.005
(0.453) (0.422)
Heater at Home 0.638 0.609 0.352
(0.481) (0.488)
Washing Machine 0.79 0.778 0.581
(0.408) (0.416)
PC at Home 0.577 0.522 0.029
(0.494) (0.5)
Internet at Home 0.417 0.344 0.003
(0.493) (0.475)
Hours for homeworks 5.49 5.26 0.305
(5.86) (5.48)
School days missed 2.68 2.72 0.755
(2.36) (2.36)
Sec. school qualification 8.51 8.38 0.003
(0.82) (0.801)
Failed subject 0.223 0.227 0.004
(0.416) (0.448)
Note: We report the mean of each variable, and its standard
deviation in parentheses. Matched takes the value 1 if the
student could be matched with the 2009 ENLACE results, 0
otherwise. The p-value on the test of equality is based on
an OLS regression of the outcome of interest regressed on the
match dummy
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Table AII: Covariates Balance for different levels of ability
Math 9th Insuff Math 9th Suff or more Math 9th Missing
T C p-value T C p-value T C p-value
T=C T=C T=C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Survey Variables
Age 16.5 16.5 0.765 16.4 16.3 0.861 16.8 16.7 0.573
(0.721) (0.705) (0.6) (0.617) (1.53) (1.01)
People in the hh 5.28 5.3 0.636 5 5.12 0.620 5.28 5.31 0.631
(1.92) (1.94) (1.51) (1.56) (1.83) (1.74)
Father works 0.942 0.926 0.196 0.942 0.925 0.230 0.949 0.948 0.877
(0.234) (0.262) (0.234) (0.264) (0.22) (0.222)
Mother works 0.49 0.482 0.857 0.495 0.459 0.341 0.495 0.429 0.120
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.499) (0.501) (0.495)
Father with primary 0.333 0.349 0.746 0.243 0.295 0.384 0.292 0.315 0.354
(0.472) (0.477) (0.429) (0.456) (0.455) (0.465)
Mother with primary 0.338 0.367 0.531 0.265 0.314 0.424 0.32 0.345 0.355
(0.473) (0.482) (0.442) (0.464) (0.467) (0.476)
Father with secondary 0.383 0.369 0.747 0.348 0.341 0.796 0.359 0.403 0.507
(0.486) (0.483) (0.477) (0.475) (0.48) (0.491)
Mother with secondary 0.409 0.39 0.742 0.373 0.408 0.240 0.401 0.46 0.226
(0.492) (0.488) (0.484) (0.492) (0.491) (0.499)
Father with hs or higher 0.284 0.282 0.919 0.409 0.364 0.508 0.349 0.282 0.098
(0.451) (0.45) (0.492) (0.481) (0.477) (0.45)
Mother with hs or higher 0.253 0.243 0.668 0.362 0.278 0.206 0.278 0.195 0.012
(0.435) (0.429) (0.481) (0.448) (0.449) (0.396)
Heater at Home 0.639 0.577 0.539 0.704 0.621 0.181 0.626 0.597 0.437
(0.481) (0.494) (0.457) (0.485) (0.485) (0.491)
Washing Machine 0.77 0.766 0.946 0.825 0.791 0.645 0.78 0.776 0.624
(0.421) (0.423) (0.38) (0.407) (0.415) (0.417)
PC at Home 0.528 0.487 0.530 0.676 0.598 0.252 0.596 0.465 0.029
(0.5) (0.5) (0.468) (0.491) (0.491) (0.499)
Internet at Home 0.369 0.35 0.737 0.512 0.419 0.285 0.432 0.276 0.006
(0.483) (0.477) (0.5) (0.494) (0.496) (0.447)
Hours for homeworks 5.44 5.33 0.995 5.52 5.68 0.997 5.56 5.03 0.283
(6.47) (6.13) (5.25) (5.62) (6.08) (4.98)
School days missed 2.89 3.08 0.435 2.13 2.51 0.044 2.75 2.69 0.727
(2.57) (2.67) (1.74) (2.16) (2.48) (2.27)
Sec. school qualification 8.27 8.21 0.296 8.79 8.72 0.627 8.42 8.36 0.308
(0.768) (0.769) (0.763) (0.812) (0.82) (0.785)
Failed subject in sec. 0.293 0.277 0.676 0.159 0.173 0.758 0.258 0.291 0.265
(0.455) (0.448) (0.366) (0.379) (0.438) (0.455)
Note: We report the mean of each variable, and its standard deviation in parentheses. The p-value on the test of
equality is based on an OLS regression of the outcome of interest regressed on the treatment dummy and the strata
dummies, with standard errors clustered at school level.
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